BACK-PAY ISSUES IN THE MILITARY:
O'CALLAHAN V. UNITED STATES
(Ct. C1. 1971).
INTRODUCTION
The growth in America of a vast military complex has left in its
wake an increasing amount of litigation between disgruntled servicemen and the various branches of the armed forces. Less than
honorably discharged individuals, disenchanted with the military's
system of justice, have turned in increasing numbers to civilian
courts for relief from what they assert are unjust military determinations. To cover all of the issues involved in these military
determinations-ranging from military status and types of discharge
to back-pay and disability retirement pay-would be an impossible
task. Thus, this article will treat but one aspect of military law;
an aspect which is most assuredly becoming of crucial significance
in the lawsuits of many servicemen. It is the area relating to
post-discharge situations, where back-pay is claimed to be due and
owing, which constitutes the focal point of this article.
It might be advisable to very briefly develop how many of the
issues concerning back-pay claims arise. A hypothetical situation
probably best illustrates the typical sequence of events. Let us
assume that Army Officer William Zam is charged with and convicted of attempted rape in a court-martial proceeding. Attached
to the conviction are a dishonorable discharge from the military
and a three-year prison sentence. Two years later, the United
States Supreme Court, on writ of habeas corpus, voids both the
conviction and the dishonorable discharge, basing its decision on

a determination that Officer Zam had been denied important constitutional rights in the court-martial trial. The Supreme Court
decision prompts Zam, who had forfeited all pay while serving his
prison term, to file a second suit-this time in the United States
Court of Claims-to recover from the government back-pay allegedly due.
It is readily apparent from the above example that the serviceman is often faced with two distinct problems:
(1) securing a reversal of his court-martial conviction; and
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(2) demonstrating a right to back-pay.
The individual obviously cannot get to the second issue before
first getting his conviction and discharge voided. The barriers
facing the serviceman in his attempt to obtain a reversal are numerous, particularly if one avenue of relief he seeks is a civilian
court.' And even if he overcomes these problems and obtains a
reversal of his conviction, there is still no guarantee that he will
recover a judgment for back-pay. Whether the individual will
emerge successful in his claim for back-pay depends upon de-

terminations of several factors. It is to these factors-and to their
nature and significance in particular factual settings-that the following discussion is directed.
PARTICULAR PROBLEMS FAcING THE S
POST-DIScHARGE CASES

eEVICA

I

The specific problems facing the serviceman in recovering upon
his claim for back-pay will naturally depend in part upon the specific facts of his case. Yet many of the more important barriers
that must be overcome are common to nearly all suits for backpay. And by following the courtroom battles of a serviceman
named James F. O'Callahan, these common problems can be isolated and analyzed.
On March 9, 1956, O'Callahan enlisted in the United States Army.
His enlistment term extended for six years. On the night of
July 20, 1956, while stationed in Hawaii, O'Callahan broke into the
1. These barriers facing the plaintiff serviceman are in large part attributable to the continued application of the separation of powers doctrine.
The deference given the atonomous nature of the military system by
civilian courts often limits the practical availability of a civilian forum.
The reviewability of both administrative and court-martial discharges, the
scope of review exercised, and the requirement forcing the serviceman to

exhaust his administrative remedies before appealing to a civilian court
are all outgrowths of the separation doctrine. Consequently, the attacking
serviceman must often face and overcome these problems before the court
will agree to look at the merits. For a discussion of these and other roadblocks facing the individual attempting to reverse his court-martial conviction or administrative discharge, see Sherman, Judicial Review of Military
Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L.
REV. 483 (1969); Vaira, ExtraordinaryRelief of Punitive and Administrative Discharges from the Armed Forces, 7 DuqIEsNE L. REv. 384 (1969);
Dougherty and Lynch, The Administrative Discharge: Military Justice?
33 Gxo. WASH. L. REV. 498 (1964); Note, Civilian Court Review of Court
MartialAdjudications,1969 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1969).

hotel room of a young girl. He was apprehended and later
brought before a court-martial, where he was tried and convicted
of assault, housebreaking, and attempted rape. He was sentenced
to ten years imprisonment and given a dishonorable discharge.
His appeals to the Army Board of Review 2 and the Court of Military Appeals 3 were unsuccessful. But the United States Supreme
Court, on writ of habeas corpus, reversed the court-martial determination, holding that "[S]ince petitioner's crimes were not
service-connected, he could not be tried by court-martial but rather
was entitled to trial by the civilian courts." 4 The decision voided
both the conviction and the dishonorable discharge. On October
6, 1969, O'Callahan brought suit in the Court of Claims for backpay, proceedings in which were stayed for a determination of his
military status. 5 On January 12, 1971, the Undersecretary of the
2. Review Boards exist in all branches of the armed forces. Established by the Secretary of each department, these five-member Boards
review at the serviceman's request the nature of the discharge, and have the

authority, subject to review by the Secretary, "[T]o change, correct, or

modify any discharge or dismissal, and to issue a new discharge in accord
with the facts presented." 10 U.S.C. § 1553(b). It seems that Review
Boards exert influence in at least two distinct areas: (1) Since often
the serviceman is required to exhaust his administrative remedies before
obtaining civilian judicial relief, he may be compelled to first take his
case to the appropriate Board, or else the court will deny review; and
(2) because the Boards and the Secretary, under 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (a), must
act harmoniously, the Secretary may at times find his otherwise extensive
powers restricted by the decisions of the Boards. For a discussion of the
Boards and their powers, see Everett, Military Administrative Discharges
-The Pendulum Swings, 1966 DuKsi L.J. 41, 62-67.
3. This court was established in 1951. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 67(a) (1), 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (1) (Supp. IV, 1969). It sits as the
Supreme Court of the military. United States v. Armbruster, 11 U.S.C.M.A.

596, 29 C.M.R. 412 (1960).

While its functions are restricted to review

of Review Board proceedings, it still represents a significant part of the

structure of appeal available to the serviceman, since it has the power to

reverse adverse Board determinations.
4. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 274 (1969). For a discussion of
this case, see Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestone or Millstone in
Military Justice? 1969 Dux L.J. 853; Nelson and Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses; An Analysis of
O'Callahanv. Parker,54 MANN. L. REv. 1 (1969).
5. O'Callahan v. United States, 451 F.2d 1390 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as O'Callahan].
6. The Secretary's authority to change or modify a discharge or dismissal is found in an oft-controverted section of Title 10 of the United
States Code, which provides in part:
The Secretary of a military department, under procedures established by him and approved by the Secretary of Defense, and acting through Boards of civilians of the executive part of that military department, may correct any military record of that department when he considers it necessary to correct an error or remove
an injustice.

10 U.S.C. § 1552(a).
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Army, acting pursuant to the Correction Board's recommendation,
changed the character of O'Callahan's discharge from dishonorable
to honorable, and discharged him as of March 8, 1961,6 the ex-

piration date of his enlistment term. O'Callahan argued that the
Secretary's act of backdating his discharge to March 8, 1961, was
arbitrary, capricious, and outside the discretion vested in his office. He asked that the court find: (1) that since he had never
been properly dismissed, the date of discharge should have been
January 12, 1971, the date when the Secretary ordered his honorable discharge; and (2) that as a result, he was entitled to all
pay and allowances for the intervening time.
The court's opinion encompassed many of the problems facing
servicemen who, after securing reversals of their convictions, have
brought suits for back-pay and allowances. The court found that
the backdating action taken by the Correction Board and the Secretary were not in abuse of their respective powers. Consequently, because the suit for back-pay was not brought within
six years of the backdated discharge," the statute of limitations
had run, 9 thereby preventing the plaintiff from recovering under
his claim. The court's treatment of the statute of limitations
question rested on determinations of several key factors. The first
such factor involved the enlistment status of the plaintiff. While
the plaintiff contended that he was entitled to back-pay up to January 12, 1971, when an honorable discharge was issued, the government cited authority for the proposition that the cut-off point
for pay and allowances was March 8, 1961, the expiration date
of the enlistment contract. 10 In one case relied on by the government, Clackum v. United States," the plaintiff had enlisted in the
Air Force Reserve on March 18, 1950, for a three-year term. She
was discharged in 1952, but in 1960 the Court of Claims invalidated the discharge. She was then given an honorable discharge

and separated from the service on March 10, 1961. In her suit for
7. O'Calahan at 1391.

8. The action was not brought until October 6, 1969, and the effective

backdated discharge date was March 8, 1961.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 provides in part as follows: "Every claim of which
the Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition
thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues."
10. O'Callahan at 1392.
11. 161 Ct. Cl. 34 (1963).

back-pay, she argued that she was entitled to compensation up to
the date of her honorable discharge. The court disagreed, stating:
. . . Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to recover the pay and

allowances she would have earned to March 10, 1961, the date on
which her only valid discharge was issued. We have twice before considered situations similar to plaintiff's, and it is our conclusion that a serviceman, illegally discharged, is entitled to recover
pay and allowances only to the date on which his term of enlistment would otherwise have expired,-in plaintiff's case, March 7,
1953.12
The court in O'Callahan agreed with the holding in Clackum.'8
Thus, recovery based on a past illegal discharge extends only from
the date of that discharge to the enlistment expiration date. There
is, however, at least one situation in which the period of recovery
varies. In cases where there is no enlistment expiration date, the
period of recovery may extend to the date when the proper discharge is given.1 4 Plaintiff O'Callahan, because of his six-year
enlistment term, obviously did not qualify under this exception.
But in Garner v. United States,'5 the court held that the plaintiff,
whose contract had extended for an indefinite period, was entitled to pay up to the date of her only valid discharge. The
court distinguished that case from Clackum by stating that the
absence of a contractually fixed termination date precluded a determination of any other cut-off point. But for the illegal discharge, the plaintiff's active-duty contract would have continued
to the date of the valid discharge. 16
By differentiating between definite and indefinite expiration
dates, the court in O'Callahan was able to reject the plaintiff's
contention that he was entitled to pay and allowances up to the
time when he was issued the honorable discharge. The effects of
this decision are several. A fixed expiration date operates as a
cut-off point for recovery, so illegally discharged servicemen with
indefinite termination periods can often obtain much greater
amounts than those with contractually set dates.1 7 This may be
12. Id. at 36. The two cases "similar to plaintiffs" were Smith v.
United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 682 (1961), and Murray v. United States, 154
Ct. Cl. 185 (1961).
13. O'Callahan at 1392. The decision, said the court, "[I]s based on
sound, time-honored contract principles, namely that neither party is bound
beyond that for which he has bargained."
14. Id. at 1392.

15. 161 Ct. Cl. 73 (1963). This was a companion case to Clackum v.
United States, discussed earlier.
16. Id. at 75. The plaintiff, illegally discharged on January 22, 1952,
was awarded pay up to March 10, 1961, the date when her only valid discharge was issued.
17. Only commissioned officers now have indefinite enlistment contracts.
Enlisted and drafted members are given contractually-fixed termination
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true even if the second class of servicemen would have re-enlisted
but for their invalid separations. Indeed, a fixed expiration date
may provide the Secretary of the service branch concerned with a
sufficient basis for denying an application for re-enlistment.1 8 This
method of separation would not be available to the Secretary if
there were no definite enlistment periods. Furthermore, the existence of a fixed expiration date gives the Secretary much broader
authority in determining dismissal dates after the voided discharge.
More than anything else, it was this extended authority that
brought about the rejection of O'Callahan's claim.
The plaintiff argued that while the Secretary had the power to
issue a new discharge, he could not retroactively backdate it to the
date of enlistment expiration.'
The plaintiff felt that since he
had not been legally dismissed from the service until 1971 (when
the Secretary corrected his record), any action by the Secretary
in backdating a dismissal date by its very nature had to be in excess of his authority. But as was mentioned above, the court rejected this argument, basing its decision on the differences between definite and indefinite contracts. 20 Whether the Secretary
should even be allowed to backdate, and in a sense validate a previously illegal discharge, is a sensitive question upon which
courts have disagreed. By issuing retroactively a dismissal date,
the Secretary can negate benefits for a period of time during which
dates. It seems that in view of the different treatment accorded officers,
it could be contended that non-officers are placed in an unfavorable and
potentially unfair position. Even if the facts surrounding the back-pay
claims of an officer and enlisted man are identical, the officer will be
allowed a much larger recovery.
18. See Davis v. United States, No. 247-69, Court of Claims (decided
November 12, 1971), where the court, in treating the same issue, said
that "the evidence certainly does not warrant a finding that the Air Force
would necessarily, or even probably, have regarded the plaintiff as an
acceptable re-enlistee."
19. O'Callahanat 1392.
20. In two cases cited by the plaintiff, Motto v. United States, 348 F.2d
523 (1965), and Hamlin v. United States, 391 F.2d 941 (1968), it was
ruled that the new discharges could not be backdated. The court in
O'Callahan distinguished these cases from the present one on the theory
that in the other situations the plaintiffs had indefinite expiration dates.
The court then added: "The cases turned on the unique legal situation
presented and do not establish any general rule that corrective honorable
discharges cannot be backdated when it is reasonable and not arbitrary or
capricious to backdate." O'Callahanat 1392.

the serviceman, had he not been illegally discharged, would have
continued in his active-duty status. This in fact occurred in Shapiro v. United States.21 In that case the plaintiff brought suit in
1947 to void a court-martial conviction and discharge in 1944, and
to recover back-pay from the date of that discharge. The court
held the court-martial invalid because the plaintiff had not been
given sufficient time to prepare his defense. 22 The Secretary of
the Army subsequently changed the plaintiff's records to show
that he had been honorably separated as of the date of his invalid
court-martial dismissal in 1944.23 It seems that here the action
taken by the Secretary in backdating was clearly an abuse of his
authority. Unlike O'Callahan, there was no basis in Shapiro for
making the dismissal date effective retroactively. There was no
mention in the case that between 1944 and 1947 an enlistment
expiration date occurred. And since the plaintiff was not legally
separated until the Secretary's issuance of an honorable discharge
in 1947, there obviously was no other time at which the serviceman's military duty was terminated. The inescapable result is that
the backdating by the Secretary of the date of discharge to the
voided dismissal date was arbitrary and capricious.
Since recovery for back-pay when incident to a voided discharge
is authorized not for services actually rendered while on active
duty but rather for services that would have resulted had the military error not occurred, 24 it can be contended that the Secretary's

act of backdating in O'Callahanwas justified. Again, the key issue in this respect is the serviceman's enlistment status. It is submitted that the plaintiff's enlistment expiration date served as a
proper benchmark for cutting off back-payments. The court found
that since the Secretary was not obligated to accept O'Callahan's
re-enlistment application, there was no reason why the government should be compelled to pay the plaintiff for any period after the expiration of his term. While the plaintiff argued that he
would have applied for re-enlistment had it not been for his invalid
separation (and thereby would have been entitled to pay for services up to the date of his honorable discharge), the court held that
the absence of a statutory right to re-enlist precluded the plaintiff from compelling his re-enlistment. 25 The plaintiff failed to
21. 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947).
22. Id. at 207.

23. See Meador, Judicial Determinations of Military Status, 72 YALE
L.J. 1293, 1310 (1963). The military still had to pay the active-duty
payments, but for all other purposes the status was "considered terminated
when it was first intended to be." Id.
24. Egan v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 377, 388 (1958).
25. O'Callahanat 1393.
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qualify under any statute providing for mandatory re-enlistment.
Consequently, the Secretary was entitled to use his discretion in accepting or rejecting the application for re-enlistment.
The
plaintiff cited authority for the proposition that a serviceman had
a statutory right to re-enlist, but the court held that only in
specific situations did this right attach. 26 It seems fair to permit
the Secretary to exercise his discretion in re-enlistment situations
where: (1) the applicant has not demonstrated a statutory right
to re-enlist; and (2) the record indicates that the applicant may be
unfit for the service. The court noted that the Supreme Court
began its opinion "[B]y reciting that he (O'Callahan) committed

the offenses charged.'

27

Thus, while the court-martial conviction

was reversed, this did not detract from the established fact that
the offenses had still been committed. To compel the Secretary
to accept the plaintiff's re-enlistment petition in this situation
would hardly seem fair. In Davis v. United States28 the same
argument confronted the court. The plaintiff, an enlisted serviceman in the Air Force, asked the court to find that he would have
re-enlisted after the expiration of his term had he not been invalidly dismissed. The court denied the plaintiff's request, holding
that the Secretary was not required to accept the plaintiff's application. The court then added that civilian courts lacked the
power to extend the term of enlistment beyond the scheduled date
of expiration, as well as the authority to retroactively re-enlist
29
the serviceman for a succeeding term.
Because the Secretary holds the power in cases like O'Ca~lahan and Davis to reject a serviceman's re-enlistment application,
there is sufficient justification for not allowing the individual to
recover for any period after his enlistment expiration date. One
could really only speculate as to whether the individual would in
fact have attempted to re-enlist, or that his application would have
26. Id. In Diamond v. United States, 344 F.2d 703 (1965), a statutory
right to re-enlist was recognized for officers who applied within the prescribed time. In Smith v. United States, 155 Ct. C1. 682 (1961), another
case cited by O'Callahan, a mandatory right to re-enlist in the Reserves
was given those servicemen who had completed twenty years of active
duty. The O'Callahan court held that neither case was applicable to the
plaintiff's situation.
27. Id.

28. No. 247-269, Ct. C1. (decided November 12, 1971).
29. Id. at 6.

been accepted had he not been illegally discharged prior to the
end of his term. It is entirely possible that this speculative aspect
alone discourages many courts from permitting recovery past a
scheduled enlistment term.
When the O'Callahan court decided that the Secretary's act of
backdating was neither capricious nor arbitrary, the plaintiff's
hopes for recovery were over. The existence of an expiration date
distinguished O'Callahan's case from others (i.e., those with indefinite expiration terms) where the cause of action accrued at the
time of the Secretary's issuance of a proper discharge. 0 Because of the six-year enlistment term, the plaintiff's cause of action began on the date of his previous dismissal-November 6,
1956. 3 1 At that time the plaintiff knew he would not be entitled
to pay or allowances accruing after the date of his court-martial.
The court's choice of the invalid discharge date as the date the action accrued was decisive, for it meant that by the time the plaintiff had filed his petition in 1969, the six-year statute of limitations had run,3 2 thereby barring his claim. In Mistretta v. United
States,3 3 the Court of Claims held that since the plaintiff's cause
of action accrued at the latest on February 13, 1945 (when his
court-martial sentence was confirmed), a suit filed on February
29, 1952, was barred for having been brought more than six years
after his cause of action first accrued. 34 In Friedman v. United
States,3 5 the court again held that the cause of action accrued all
at once upon the serviceman's release. 36 Supported by these cases,
the court in O'Callahan concluded that the plaintiff's cause of action began when he was originally discharged; and that since
thirteen years had passed before the petition for back-pay was filed,
the applicable statute barred the claim.
The theory that a cause of action accrues on the date of release has not been followed in every situation. It has already
been noted that where a serviceman's termination date is indefinite, his cause of action accrues when the Secretary issues the
proper discharge. This benchmark is also used in other situations.
In Proper v. United States,37 the plaintiff attempted to recover
disability retirement pay. The government contended that the
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See discussion at note 20 supra.
O'Callahanat 1393.
See note 9 supra.
128 Ct. C1. 41 (1954).
Id. at 44, 45.
310 F.2d 381 (1962).
Id. at 387.
154 F. Supp. 317 (1957).
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claim accrued when the plaintiff was released, and that since
more than six years had elapsed before filing of the suit, the
statute had run. This argument was very similar to the government's theory in O'Callahan. But while the O'Callahan court
accepted this theory, the court rejected it in Proper. As in O'Cala
han, the plaintiff's claim was based on the alleged arbitrary acts
of the Secretary. Yet the Proper court held that since the action
accrued when the Secretary acted, and not when the serviceman
was released from active-duty status, the statute had not run:
[P]laintiff's cause of action is not based on the alleged arbitrary
action of the Correction Board but rather on the alleged arbitrary
action of the Secretary of the Army in 1955, acting not through
the Correction Board but independently and in fact contrary to the
findings, conclusions and recommendations of such Board....
Accordingly, we hold that the plaintiffs claim based on the alleged
arbitrary action of the Secretary
of the Army is not barred by
8
the statute of limitations.3
It must be noted that Proper differs from O'Callahan in several
respects. For example, while one case was brought for disability
retirement pay, the other was based on a claim for back-pay.
Also, the plaintiff in Proper was challenging the Secretary's action
denying him disabled retirement status; while in O'Callahan the
serviceman never contended that his severance was unfair. These
and other reasons may account for the different accrual dates
decided upon by the two courts. But the fact remains that if
O'Callahancould have convinced the court that his claim accrued
in 1971 when the Secretary backdated his discharge, he could have
hurdled the statute of limitations barrier, and in all likelihood
could have proceeded to recovery under his claim.
While O'Callahan's petition was dismissed on the basis of the
running of the statute, other servicemen's claims have been rejected on a related ground-laches. It is reasonable to believe
that the court could have accepted this defense against O'Callahan himself, since more than ten years had passed prior to his
filing suit in the Court of Claims. Because back-pay suits by nature involve claims emanating from past administrative or courtmartial proceedings, it is characteristically common for the defense
of laches to be raised. This, obviously, is particularly true when
38. Id. at 318.

the statute of limitations is found inapplicable. The additional
burdens placed on the defendant-such as a showing that the
plaintiff was guilty of unreasonable and culpable delay in filing
his suit-make this defense initially less attractive than the statute
of limitations. But the doctrine of laches is nevertheless an important and oft-asserted defense in O'Callahanback-pay-type cases,
and it therefore deserves attention.
As early as 1919 the Supreme Court held that a public employee
must exercise diligence in establishing his rights based on an unlawful discharge. 39 Since then the application of laches in both
civilian 40 and military 4' back-pay suits has been continuously endorsed by federal courts. And as is the case whenever the statute
of limitations is involved, the application of laches almost invariably brings the exhaustion of remedies requirement into focus.
The serviceman usually contends either: (1) that pursuit of his administrative remedies was mandatory, so that in the event it takes
him three years to exhaust his available military channels, those
years should not be available for use in the defense of laches;
or (2) that even if these remedies should be considered optional,
they were reasonable steps to take for the protection of his rights
in those circumstances. Thus, in both approaches it is contended
that in fairness and in right laches should not encompass the
period when administrative appeals are taken. On the other hand,
the government normally asserts that because the military remedies are permissive, resort to such channels does not defer or excuse the plaintiff's delay in filing suit in a civilian court. In Jackson v. United States42 the court was confronted with these theories.
The plaintiffs argued that their continuous administrative attempts
to overcome their court-martial convictions rendered the defense
of laches inappropriate. But the court rejected this claim and
found that their unreasonable delay in filing suit for back-pay in
the Court of Claims barred any consideration of the merits. The
plaintiffs had waited three years after the final military action
before suing in a District Court to obtain reversals of their convictions. Then, after the voiding of the convictions, they had
39. Arant v. Lane, 249 U.S. 367 (1919). The Supreme Court held that:
When a public official is unlawfully removed from office, whether
from disregard of the law by his superior or from mistake as to
the facts of his case, obvious considerations of public policy make
it of first importance that he should take the action requisite to

Id. at 372.
effectively assert his rights ....
40. See Jackson v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 29, cert. denied, 389 U.S.
985 (1967).
41. See Grisham v. United States, 392 F.2d 980 (1968).

42. 179 Ct. Cl. 29 (1967).
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waited another eighteen months before suing in the Court of Claims.
The court found that the three years which had passed before filing
of the suit in the District Court, added to the time that had elapsed
prior to the assertion of their claims in the present court, constituted an unwarranted and unreasonable delay. The determining
factor, concluded the court, was that throughout these years the
plaintiffs could have obtained full relief from their convictions
and withheld back-pay in the present court. 43 The authority of the
Court of Claims to entertain suits for back-pay based on allegedly
invalid separations had previously been established.4 4 In this situation, with the element of reviewability established-as well as
the fact that the plaintiffs had taken their final military actions
available to them nearly five years prior to their suit in the Court
of Claims-it seems that the court's decision to apply the laches
defense was appropriate.
CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing discussion, it should now be clear that
the problems confronting the serviceman in his attempt to recover
back-pay and allowances are characteristically complex and always burdensome. Issues relating to definite and indefinite expiration dates, the statute of limitations and laches are all factors

capable of bringing about the rejection of the serviceman's claim.
Additionally, the claimant must contend with and overcome his
greatest barrier-the unusually broad statutory and discretionary powers entrusted in the office of the Secretary of the service
branch concerned. As evidenced by O'Callahan, the Secretary's
authority to act extends to nearly all aspects of the typical backpay suit. In all cases he holds the discretionary power, "when it
43. Id. at 38.
44. See Shaw v. United States, 357 F.2d 949, 953 (1966), where the court
held that a court-martial conviction was "no bar to recovery" when that
conviction included a denial of a fundamental constitutional right. See
also, Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947), where it was held:
That an egregious wrong had been committed against this plaintiff
we have no doubt; our only concern is whether we have jurisdiction to right that wrong. We have no power to review the courtmartial proceedings; we can give relief only if the verdict of the
court-martial was absolutely void and, therefore, forms no foundation for plaintiffs dismissal. If it was void, it is settled that we
have jurisdiction to render judgment for the pay of which he was
illegally deprived. Id. at 207.

is reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious, ' 45 to backdate the
effective date of an honorable discharge to the termination date
of the enlistment period. It is also his discretion that often determines whether an individual's re-enlistment application will be
accepted or rejected. With these and other powers the Secretary
is frequently able to control the outcome of the serviceman's case.
Thus, it is readily apparent that the serviceman, even after securing a reversal of his prior illegal discharge, is in no way assured
of recovering on his claim for back-pay. Instead, he must encounter problems which never confronted him in his suit to reverse his dismissal. And if he fails at any level to overcome any
of these defenses, his claim for back-pay will almost invariably
be rejected.
JEFFREY

45. O'Callahanat 1393.
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